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Abstract 
 
There has been almost no research into what makes an effective chairperson in a university 
department.  This paper constructs a historical longitudinal dataset on economics departments in 58 
US research universities.  It documents evidence that a department’s research output tends to improve 
substantially when the incoming department Chair is himself or herself an outstanding scholar (in 
particular, is highly cited).  The analysis adjusts for a set of other possible influences, including the 
standing of the department, university resources, the previous Chair, the trend in the department’s 
productivity, and time-lags.  Possible interpretations, and implications for future research, are 
discussed.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is an attempt to contribute to the research literatures on intellectual productivity, 
the role of bibliometric data, and the nature of departmental leadership in universities.  Although 
research is pursued in approximately 300,000 university departments, housed in more than 20,000 
universities worldwide4, little is known about the factors that help to shape the productivity of those 
departments5.  The aim of the paper is to study the possible influence of chairpersons.  Chairs (or 
‘Heads of Department’) play a major role in the academic departments that make up universities.  
They manage daily operations, hire faculty and professional staff, and work closely with senior 
university administrators, most of whom were themselves once departmental heads.  However, 
because faculty often view the position as a poisoned chalice, these chairpersons can be reluctant 
leaders, who are selected through either moral persuasion or a rotation system that sometimes 
depends as much on a scholar’s age as aptitude for the job (Clotfelter & Rothschild, 1993; Ehrenberg, 
1999, 2003).  
Like Frey & Eichenberger (1993), Ehrenberg (2003), Rute Cardoso et al. (2010), Hamermesh 
and Pfann (2012) and Laband & Majumdar (2012), our focus is on empirical patterns in the subject 
of academic economics.  The paper also touches, however, upon a wider and long-running set of 
debates about the measurement of research productivity, and on the use of citations data in academia 
(Taylor 2011).   
The research begins by constructing a new source of data (for ourselves and other researchers 
who wish to use the data set).  It compiles a panel data set on U.S. economics departments.  To our 
knowledge, the later analysis is the first to examine the association between the characteristics of an 
incoming chairperson and the subsequent research productivity of his or her university department.  
The level of an individual chairperson’s citations is found to be a predictor of later departmental 
productivity. 6  Although a long-standing literature examines the potentially substantive influence of 
citations data as informative signals (for example, Hamermesh et al. 1982, Laband 1986, and Laband 
& Sophocleus 1985, and Ellison 2011), the current paper’s concern has not, to our knowledge, been 
previously explored.  The study examines the statistical links between the characteristics of incoming 
Chairs and the later scientific productivity of their departments while that Chair is still in post.  Some 
                                                 
4 Cybermetrics Lab, Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC), Spain. 
5 Novel recent work by Adams & Clemmons (2011) explores a different mechanism than the one studied here. 
6 This study uses observational data and adopts the ‘prospective’ method of analysis that is common in medical science 
rather than a randomized-trial design (Antonakis, Bendahan, Jacquart & Lalive, 2010).   
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of the implied lags are necessarily long ones (in the case of the long-serving Chairs).  Variables are 
defined more fully in the later Table 1.   
This study cannot solve all potential problems of cause-and-effect, but, in an area where there 
is currently virtually no research knowledge, it is our hope that it might help to encourage future 
research.  The paper pursues the so-called ‘prospective’ methodology that is common in medical 
longitudinal studies, and could be seen as a simple empirical beginning on a complicated issue.  First, 
data are collected here on 169 chairpersons in 58 US university departments over 15 years, for one 
of the largest university disciplines, namely, the field of economics.  Second, over the course of 
several years, measures of subsequent departmental research success were collected and checked 
using diverse websites and extensive hard-copy materials.  The dependent variable in the regression 
equations is the subsequent change in economics departments’ research output, after the Chair has 
been appointed, which is constructed as a measure of the relative improvement in departmental 
productivity.  Several independent variables are controlled for, including institutional variables such 
as income and federal grants, and Chairs’ other characteristics, such as their gender, experience and 
publications.  Perhaps the most striking result is that there appears to be an increasing and concave 
statistical relationship between a Chair’s citations and the subsequent department performance. 
The data and descriptive statistics are presented in Section 3, and the econometric analyses 
and results follow in Section 4.  Finally, in Section 5 we revisit the literature and discuss possible 
explanations. 
 
II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
 
There is a growing literature on the nature of scientific production and the importance of 
effective leadership in its success7.  Recent work suggests that the management of research enterprise 
has become more complicated as modern scientific study is increasingly produced by teams, that 
have grown in size, are more likely to involve multi-university collaborations, that are ever more 
geographically dispersed (Adams, Black, Clemmons & Stephan, 2005; Wuchty, Jones & Uzzi, 2007; 
Jones, Wuchty & Uzzi, 2008).   It is not surprising then that management practices, such as rewards 
and incentives, and research evaluation processes, are found to be associated with the performance 
of research teams (see Van der Weijden, de Gilder, Groenewegen & Klasen, 2008).   Academic 
                                                 
7 Early studies that modern work builds on include: Pelz, 1956; Andrews & Farris, 1967; Blume & Sinclair, 1973, among 
others.  
4 
 
departments frequently house many (ever-evolving) research teams and the head of these units must 
manage a larger, more heterogeneous group of faculty who have a broader mission than pure research 
(Hottenrott & Thorwarth 2011).   
The role of academic departments, and the Chairs who manage them, is particularly critical 
in research universities that tend to be decentralised with devolved powers (particular in regards to 
managing faculty) going to departments.   Their important function is highlighted in a new study that 
assesses the effect of management practices on the performance of universities (McCormack, 
Propper & Smith, 2013).   McCormack, Propper & Smith (2013) examine management procedures 
in 112 UK universities using the measure of management quality tool developed by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007).  McCormack and colleagues (2013) interview 248 department Chairs in the 
disciplines of Business, Computer Science, Psychology, and English.  They find that the quality of 
management practices can be directly linked to better performance in both research and teaching.  
The result holds for all types of universities – research or teaching-focused, new or old.  Of particular 
relevance to our study is their finding that it is management practiced at the level of academic 
departments, not by the centralized human resources that matters most to research and teaching 
performance.   
Beerkens (2013) reports a similar finding in Australian universities that have been subject to 
increased competition by government since the mid-1990s.  She uses a research management index 
that aggregates a number of management practices at the institutional, school and individual level.  
She finds that universities with intensive research management systems are associated with greater 
research productivity.   
A small number of studies have looked at the influence of distinguished scholars on the 
productivity of their peers and co-authors.  Azoulay, Zivin, & Wang (2010) found that the sudden 
death of a ‘superstar’ researcher led to the decline in collaborators’ quality-adjusted publication rates.  
Oettl (2012a,b) builds on this work by looking at the social factors -- helpfulness to other scientists 
-- that may explain how star scientists affect others.   
Chairs generally serve at the discretion of a senior manager (e.g. dean, provost, president) 
and prior work suggests that there is a systematic pattern to who holds the position.  For example, 
department Chairs are disproportionately likely to be white and male, although women and minorities 
have recently been increasing in number (Carroll & Wolverton, 2004; Conrad, Carr, Knight, 
Renfrew, Dunn & Pololi, 2010).   It is not unusual for senior administrators to select Chairs who 
have either undergone a decline in research productivity or made fewer research-specific investments 
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over their careers (McDowell, Singell & Stater, 2009; McDowell, Singell & Stater, 2011), although 
it is less common in Tier 1 research universities that assign greater weight to the research productivity 
of potential departmental Chairs (Moore, Newman, & Turnbull. 2003; Ness & Samet, 2010, 
Ehrenberg, 1999).   
 
III. DATA AND BASIC STATISTICS 
 
We constructed a dataset on 169 chairpersons in 58 US economics departments over a fifteen-
year period between 1995 and 20108.  The data-collection process was necessarily deliberate, 
because it required a large number of hard-copy sources as well as more modern electronic ones.   
All sampled Chairs are observed for each year following his/her appointment and through the year 
following the end of the Chair term.  For instance, a chair whose term encompasses the period 
beginning Fall 2001 through the end of Spring 2004 (i.e., a three-year appointment) would be 
observed in our data in the years 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005.  On average, each sampled chair is 
observed in 4.27 temporal periods. The independent variables in the regression equations include 
career and demographic information about each Chair, and our dependent variable includes measures 
of subsequent departmental research success. 
 
(INSERT Table 1 HERE) 
 
3.1 Dependent Variable  
The dependent variable is the change in economics departments’ research output after a Chair 
has been appointed.  In our work, it is defined as a measure of the relative improvement in 
departmental productivity (see Table 1: Variable Definitions).  Specifically, departmental research 
success is calculated as the change in the share of total weighted US economics Department 
publications (i.e.1/n and quality index) measured between the first year (t=0) of the Chair’s 
appointment and the subsequent observed year t, where research output in any specific year t is 
measured by a 3-yr moving average in years t-1, t, and t+1.   
                                                 
8  In the 58 departments, there were a total of 295 individuals who served as either a permanent or interim Chair 
between 1995 and 2010.  Our sample excludes all interim Chairs, all Chairs who were appointed before 1995 or after 
2007, and all permanent Chairs whose observed Chair term (for whatever reason) was less than two years. 
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As an illustration, the dependent variables associated with a chair whose appointment begins 
in 2001 and ends in 2004 would be as follows: in the 2002 observation, the dependent variable is 
measured as the department's share of total economics department publications in 2002 minus the 
share in 2001;  in the 2003 observation, the dependent variable is measured as the department's share 
of total economics department publications in 2003 minus the share in 2001; in the 2004 observation, 
the dependent variable is measured as the department's share of total economics department 
publications in 2004 minus the share in 2001; and in the 2005 observation, the dependent variable is 
measured as the department's share of total economics department publications in 2005 minus the 
share in 2001. The dependent variable uses publications data (collected annually over the years 1995 
through 2010) from 11 of the “most-selective” journals. These include: American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica9, International Economic Review, Journal of 
Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Review of Economic Studies.  Only data 
relating to full articles are collected, thus excluding comments, replies and other such shorter forms 
of communications.   
Table A1 in the Appendix presents an illustrative ranking of economics departments over 15 
years (1995-2010)  using our dependent variable -- the mean annual research output of total weighted 
publications authored by individuals with an affiliation in a US economics department (for the need 
to be cautious about such rankings, see Laband 2013).  Six institutions included in Table A1 could 
not be used in the empirical analysis because either: a) no Chair was appointed after 1994 for which 
at least 3 consecutive years can be observed (Arizona State University and Ohio State); b) 
unavailability of our university revenue variable, Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
(Dartmouth and Rutgers); and c) there was insufficiently delineated Economics department (Caltech 
and Cornell).   
 
3.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables in our regression equations draw upon information about the 
Chairs and their institutions (see Table 1).  We include three measures for the Chair’s research output, 
which is our key explanatory variable: Chair’s citations represent the cumulative number of citations 
                                                 
9 The inclusion of Economica may look surprising to some readers, but this is for the historical reason that it was an 
important journal in the early years in our data collection period.  
7 
 
made to the Chair’s five most highly cited articles published prior to his/her Chair appointment 
(measured, out of necessity10, as a citations total in the year 2016).   
We also control for the number of years since each of the Chair’s five most-cited papers were 
published (the total number of years are averaged).  Finally, we include Chair’s cumulative number 
of total weighted journal publications measured to year t. The weighted measures convert page 
counts to American Economic Association-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for co-authored articles, 
and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in the various annual 
editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
Further information about Chairs’ characteristics are included in the regressions: gender, 
whether they were foreign-born, the number of years the Chair has been in the current Chair position, 
their total experience at appointment measured as years since PhD to the year in which the current 
Chair term began, the years spent at each university, the number of institutions in which he or she 
had worked, and finally,  we include a set of dichotomous variables indicating the Chair’s research 
field (i.e. microeconomics, macroeconomics, history/thought, monetary, quantitative, public finance, 
international, agriculture/environmental, industrial organization, labor, other). 
Controls for the nature of each institution are also incorporated (see Table 1).  These measure 
the department’s research output at the start of the Chair’s term, the number of citations made to the 
five most highly cited articles published by the Chair who immediately preceded the current observed 
Chair, the size of each department (we include a proxy for the number of economics PhDs11), and 
the wealth of each university.   To capture trends in the US academic markets for economists, we 
include variables that measure the Chair’s institution’s share of economics publications that do not 
go to economics departments (i.e. business schools), and the share of top publications assigned to 
authors not affiliated with a US economics department.  Finally, we include a set of dichotomous 
variables indicating the calendar year (i.e. 1995, 1996, 1997 … 2010).  Summary statistics for our 
variables are presented in Table A2.  
 
                                                 
10 It could be argued that the ideal citations variable would be one taken during the year (say, 1995) when the Chair was 
being appointed.  From the vantage point of 2016, this was not technically feasible for us.  However, it should only lead 
to incorrect results in the rare case where there was a breakthrough article which took many years to be noticed by other 
scholars.  Moreover, it might be argued that the ‘true’ research ability of a Chair is revealed to outsiders only after decades 
have passed, and on such an argument that could make our variable the appropriate one.  
11 It might be thought that we should control for the change in the size of department, but we wish to treat that as 
potentially influenced by the success of the Chairperson.  We examine a kind of reduced-form equation.  
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IV. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 reports the study’s findings.  Each rightward column introduces additional controls to a base 
specification in Column 1.  For reasons of brevity, the results are condensed into a single table (a 
number of alternative variants have been tested and are available upon request).   Clustered standard 
errors are used for the reported t-statistics in parentheses. 
In Model 1 of Table 2, the key variable, Chair’s citations, is statistically significant at the 5% 
level; the coefficient is 0.0687 and the t-statistic is 2.19.  The coefficient on the quadratic term (of -
0.0232) is negative and significant at the 5% level.  It follows that the relationship between a 
department’s research output and a Chair’s research citations is estimated to be concave from below.  
There is diminishing marginal returns to Chair quality.   
 
(INSERT Table 2 HERE) 
 
The performance-citations relationship is plotted in Figure 1.  Departmental performance, 
shown on the y-axis, maximizes within the figure where a Chair has approximately 14,800 citations.  
With a mean citation number of 3,531 and a standard deviation of 4,975, it is unclear how literally 
this exact turning point should be taken.  The reason is that there are only 11 departmental heads who 
have citations in excess of 14,800.  In our judgment, it may be more natural to view the evidence as 
confirming a highly concave relationship (perhaps because Chairs reduce their own research and thus 
face an opportunity cost, or perhaps because leadership input itself exhibits diminishing marginal 
returns in the way that inputs like labour and capital do).  
  The finding of diminishing returns to a Chair’s citations appears to be a robust statistical 
conclusion.12  Model 1 in Table 2 also suggests evidence that a department’s research productivity 
may exhibit reversion to the mean.  The coefficient on a department’s research output at the start of 
a Chair’s term is -0.1228 with a t-statistic of -2.64.  Finally, and as a check for even longer lagged 
effects, the inclusion of a variable for the previous Chair’s citations enters positively and 
significantly.    
 
(INSERT Figure 1 HERE) 
                                                 
12 We have experimented with other nonlinear functional forms.  
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  A natural hypothesis is that what matters is a department head’s own publishing productivity.  
Thus, Model 2 in Table 2 introduces controls for the total number of weighted publications and the 
timing of citations.  Importantly, the magnitude, sign, and significance of both the level and quadratic 
terms on Chair’s citations are barely affected by the introduction of these controls.  Moreover, the 
coefficients on the level and quadratic terms for the total number of weighted publications are 
insignificantly different from zero.   This finding implies that it is not the quantity of papers published 
by a Chair that matters but instead the extent to which the Chair’s work has been recognized through 
cited references to his or her research13.  In addition, the coefficient on the number of years since 
each of the Chair’s most-cited papers were published is insignificant and has no effect on the link 
between the person’s citations and the department’s research productivity.     
Model 3, in the third column of Table 2, introduces demographic attributes and other aspects 
of a Chair’s career into the empirical specification.  Again, the broad conclusions remain, and there 
is some evidence that the effect of the Chair’s citations actually strengthens (now significant at the 
1% level).  The coefficients on some of the newly introduced controls in Model 3 are insignificant 
at traditional levels (i.e., the controls for gender, foreign-born, years as Chair, and Chair’s years at 
current university).  However, the estimated effect of the number of institutions where Chair has 
worked is positive and marginally significant.  Moreover, there appears to be a non-linear, 
statistically significant effect associated with the Chair’s experience at appointment, suggesting a 
Chair’s years since PhD has a positive net effect after approximately two decades of experience.   In 
other words, all else equal, the tradition of putting more senior faculty in the position of Chair may 
be consistent with a raising of a department’s research productivity. 
In Model 4 of Table 2 we include a number of further variables to control for the size of the 
Economics department and for university characteristics (see Table 1: Variable Definitions).   In 
general, the conclusions drawn from the previous models are unaltered, although the estimated mean-
reversion effect increases.  Many of the newly introduced institutional variables are significant at 
traditional levels.  Specifically, the share of publications to non-US economics departments has a 
significantly negative effect; this is presumably because articles that are published to authors outside 
the US economics departments reduce the available pool.  The institution’s share of economics 
publications that are authored by faculty based in non-economics departments (e.g., business and 
                                                 
13 As an extra check we include a control for the Chair's own publications during his/her term as department head.  We 
found no significance attached to the chair's "own contribution" control.   
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policy schools) in the Chair’s institution is weakly positive.  The Total Economics PhDs granted at 
the Chair’s university’ measures the number of economics PhDs conferred over the years 1995-2010, 
which is a proxy for the size of the department.  This coefficient is positive but insignificant. 
  Two of the variables in Model 4 of Table 2 control for university income/revenues (data 
collected from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System).  While the university’s share 
of federal grants is not found to be significant, the total current revenue in year t is positive and 
significant at the 5% level.  This variable comprises revenues from tuition and fees, government 
appropriations (federal, state and local), private gifts, grants and contracts, endowment income, sales 
and services of educational activities, "auxiliary enterprises", hospitals, "other sources", and 
"independent operations".  It is noteworthy that the introduction of university revenue in Model 4 
does not alter the previous results.  However, the significance of the financial variable in Model 4 
suggests that change in departmental quality -- research output -- is tied to aggregate university 
revenue.  We checked for interaction effects of university revenue with the Chair variable and found 
no significance for such interaction terms.    
Finally, highly cited Chairs might be found more often in departments with faster growing 
shares of publications because of a potential willingness of highly cited Chairs to go into leadership 
positions where department productivity is growing (and not because the highly cited Chairs 
contributed to the increased productivity).  To explore this important possibility, an extra right-hand 
side variable, Department Productivity Trend, was added in the Model 4 econometric specification.  
This variable was constructed by using the coefficients for a linear time trend in department share of 
publications for each of the economics departments in the sample.  The inclusion of this department-
trend variable did not alter the main conclusions of the paper; we were unable to find evidence for 
the idea that the correlation between the Chair’s citations and later departmental productivity is the 
result of the relative attraction of talented scholars into the position of Chair in flourishing 
departments.   
The four specifications in Table 2 demonstrate that the citations-curve relationship is robust 
and economically significant.  The evidence for a longitudinal link between a Chair’s citations and 
the later research output of the department is not strongly influenced by changes in the detailed 
econometric specification.  Second, the last row of Table 2 presents the number of citations at which 
the quadratic reaches its maximum in each model.  The point at which the curve turns is numerically 
similar, at between 14,806 and 18,067 lifetime citations, across the four columns.  If taken literally, 
the implied effect of Chairs is large.  A one standard deviation rise in a chairperson’s citations (from 
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a base of zero citations) is associated here with a later improvement of approximately one half of a 
standard deviation in the department’s later research productivity14. 
 
V. DISCUSSION 
 
What could be the mechanism through which Chairs have an influence on the research output 
of academic departments? How might this depend upon citations to their own research?  Oettl (2012a, 
b) shows that the death of star researchers who are acknowledged by many people on academic 
papers – a measure of helpfulness – has a later effect on the productivity of co-authors.  In later work, 
Agrawal, McHale, and Oettl (2014) examine the effect of top researchers on the productivity of 255 
evolutionary biology departments.  The authors find that the arrival of star researchers attracts 
subsequent high-quality scientists.  This finding is strongest in mid-ranking universities.  These 
studies may help us to understand our key finding.  A Chair’s research citations may signify that they 
are high on helpfulness (Oettle 2012a), and that they are able to recruit strong scholars to their 
departments (Agrawal, McHale & Oettl, 2014).  Moreover, academics who have had successful 
research careers may behave differently when they become department Chairs.   
Our study is closely related to earlier work (Goodall, 2006, 2009a,b) that uncovered a 
relationship between the research citations of a university president and the later research 
performance of their institution.  Interviews with university presidents (Goodall 2009a,b) also 
revealed that scholar-leaders found it easier to recruit and retain other top scholars.  This may be 
because of reputational factors (Hamermesh & Pfann, 2012), or because a head who is a cited scholar 
signals to potential recruits that he or she understands how to create the right environment for 
academics (Andrews & Farris1967; Goodall, 2009a,b).   McCormack, Propper, & Smith (2013) 
show, in UK universities, that departments which are better managed demonstrate better performance 
in both research and teaching.  Importantly, they conclude, as we do, that the results are not driven 
by differences in resources. Thus the nature of leaders seems to matter.   
The suggestion that leaders and followers should share equivalent levels of technical 
expertise has also been examined previously in different settings – for example in basketball 
(Goodall, Kahn & Oswald,  2011) – and in early cross-sectional studies (e.g. Andrews & Farris, 
1967; Barnowe, 1975; McAuley, Duberley, & Cohen, 2000; Mumford, Marks, Connelly, Zaccaro & 
                                                 
14 In the long run, however, it is slightly smaller than this.  That is because the equation is essentially a classical difference 
equation and the negative lagged dependent variable implies that steady-state effects will be lower.  
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Reiter-Palmon, 2000).   Mumford, Scott, Gaddis, & Strange (2002) summarize these findings: they 
argue that technical and creative problem-solving skills are necessary when leading creative people, 
and that the evaluation of researchers and their ideas is best done by individuals who share their 
competencies.  Also, leaders who have the same creative and technical abilities as their followers 
can communicate clearly and articulate the goals of the organization (Mumford et al., 2002). 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Comparatively little is known about academic leadership.  In what we believe to be the first 
study of its kind, this analysis compiles a new dataset on, and examines the statistical connections 
between, the characteristics of incoming Chairs and the later productivity of economics departments.  
The study follows in the broader tradition of work such as Ehrenberg (2003).   
We find that departments tend to increase their productivity after the appointment of a 
distinguished chairperson (and that this does not seem to be because top-scholar Chairs join 
departments that have already begun to flourish).  The issue of exactly what makes an effective Chair, 
and why in particular a person’s citations are an influential statistical signal, remains to be fully 
understood.  Caution is thus prudent in the interpretation of the paper’s findings15.  Nevertheless, we 
hope that this paper may offer a contribution to the start of a research literature in this complex area.    
                                                 
15  Tools used in natural experiments such as data on deaths of leaders (e.g. Jones & Olken, 2005) are not currently 
possible in our setting because so few Chairs die in post.  We need therefore to be careful -- we want to emphasize -- 
not to give a definitive causal interpretation to the patterns in the data.   
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Figure 1 
 
  Improvement in Productivity of Economics Departments is 
 Correlated with an Incoming Department Chair’s Citations 
                              [after controlling for the model 1 variables listed in Table 2] 
 
 
 
Notes: (i) The dependent variable is defined in Table 1.  It covers all the later years, not a single year, after the 
appointment of that Chair.  (ii) Only 11 of 169 Chairpersons had lifetime citations above the turning point of 
approximately 14,800 citations. (iii) This curve is based on Column 1 in Table 2. (iv) The level of research output is 
measured as a 3-yr moving average. 
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Table 1  
 
Variable Definitions 
 
Dependent Variable 
Change in department’s research output:  The change in a department’s share of total US 
weighted publications (i.e. 1/n and quality index) is measured between the first year (t=0) of the 
Chair’s appointment and the observed year during the Chair’s tenure as chairperson, t.  Tenures 
vary in length; some are long.   
Research output in year t is measured by a 3-yr moving average in years t-1, t, and t+1.   
Publications data is collected annually over the years 1995 through 2010 from the following select 
journals: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica, 
International Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, 
Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and 
Statistics, and the Review of Economic Studies.  Only data relating to full articles are collected, 
thus excluding comments, replies and other such shorter forms of communications. 
 
Independent Variables 
(1) Chair’s research output 
Chair’s citations: The cumulative number of citations made to the Chair’s five most highly cited 
articles that were published prior to his/her Chair appointment (measured in 2012).   
Previous Chair’s citations: The cumulative number of citations made to the five most highly cited 
articles published by the Chair who immediately preceded the current observed Chair.  These most-
cited articles relate only to those that were published before the Previous Chair’s year of 
appointment (where again the citations are measured in 2016). 
Number of years since Chair’s most-cited work: The number of years since each of the Chair’s 
five most-cited papers were published; the total number of years are averaged.  
Chair’s total weighted publications:  Chair’s cumulative number of total weighted (i.e. 1/n and 
quality index) journal publications measured to year t. 
The weighted measures convert page counts to AEA-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for 
coauthored articles, and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in 
the various annual editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
(2) Chair Characteristics 
19 
 
Female Chair: Dichotomous variable = 1 if the Chair is female.  
Foreign-born Chair: Dichotomous variable = 1 if the Chair has a non-US birthplace.  
Years as Chair: The number of years the Chair has been in the current Chair position. 
Chair’s experience at appointment: The number of years since the Chair received his/her PhD 
to the year in which the current Chair term began. 
Chair’s years at university: The number of years that the Chair has worked at the university prior 
to his/her Chair appointment. 
Number of institutions where Chair has worked: The number of institutions the Chair has had 
a permanent appointment measured from the PhD year to the year of the Chair’s appointment.   
(3) Institution Controls 
Department’s research output at the start of the Chair’s term: The department share of total 
weighted US economics publications in the first year of Chair’s term (this is an average of weighted 
publications in the year immediately prior to the Chair appointment, in the year of the appointment, 
and the first year after).  
Share of world publications to non-US Economics departments: The share of all weighted 
publications in year t that are authored by individuals with a non-US economics department 
affiliation over the years 1995-2010.   
Institution’s share of economics publications to business and policy schools:  The Chair’s 
institution’s share of all weighted publications in year t that are authored by individuals in a US 
non-Economics department (e.g. business schools, policy schools, etc.) over the years 1995-2010.   
Total economics PhDs granted at Chair’s university: The total number of economics PhDs 
granted by the Chair’s university over the years 1995-2010. 
University revenue: Total current fund revenues in year t (millions).  This variable includes: 
tuition and fees, government appropriations (federal, state and local), private gifts, grants and 
contracts, endowment income, sales and services of educational activities, "auxiliary enterprises", 
hospitals, "other sources", and "independent operations". Data collected from the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS). 
University’s share of federal grants: The Chair’s university’s share (%) of the total (i.e., in 
sampled institutions) federal grants in year t. Data collected from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (IPEDS). 
Department productivity trend: The department-specific productivity trend variable was 
constructed by using the coefficients for a linear time trend in department share of publications 
over the entire sample period of 1995-2010. 
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(4) Field dummies 
Set of dichotomous variables indicating the Chair’s research field (i.e. microeconomics, 
macroeconomics, history/thought, monetary, quantitative, public finance, international, 
agriculture/environmental, industrial organization, labor, other). 
(5) Year dummies 
Set of dichotomous variables indicating the calendar year (i.e. 1995, 1996, 1997 … 2010). 
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Table 2 
 
Determinants of the Later Improvement in a Department’s Research Performance 
 
(The dependent variable is the change in the department’s research output measured between the 
first year of the incoming Chair’s appointment and the observed year.) 
 
 
 
Explanatory variable 
 
 
Model 1 
 
 
Model 2 
 
 
Model 3 
 
 
Model 4 
Chair’s citations 
(scaled by 1000) 
0.0687** 
(2.19) 
0.0742** 
(2.24) 
0.0887*** 
(2.80) 
0.0813*** 
(2.68) 
Chair’s citations squared 
(scaled by 10 million) 
-0.0232** 
(-2.05) 
-0.0246** 
(-2.12) 
-0.0288** 
(-2.65) 
-0.0225** 
(-2.43) 
Previous Chair’s citations 
(scaled by 1000) 
0.0220** 
(2.05) 
0.0214** 
(1.98) 
0.0249*** 
(2.53) 
0.0230** 
(2.18) 
Department’s research output at the 
start of the Chair’s term 
-0.1228*** 
(-2.64) 
-0.1204*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.1118*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.2549*** 
(-4.89) 
Number of years since Chair’s most- 
cited work 
 -0.0070 
(-0.59) 
-0.0218 
(-1.54) 
-0.0124 
(-1.11) 
 
Chair’s weighted publications 
 -0.0045 
(-0.58) 
-0.0063 
(-0.85) 
-0.0053 
(-0.77) 
Chair’s weighted 
publications squared (scaled by 10) 
 0.0005 
(0.58) 
0.0003 
(0.44) 
0.0006 
(0.79) 
 
Female Chair 
  0.1725 
(1.00) 
0.1306 
(1.12) 
 
Foreign-born Chair 
  -0.0099 
(-0.11) 
-0.0305 
(-0.44) 
 
Years as Chair 
  0.0187 
(0.99) 
0.0088 
(0.51) 
 
Chair’s experience at appointment 
  -0.0769** 
(-2.01) 
-0.0497** 
(-2.00) 
Chair’s experience at appointment 
squared 
  0.0019** 
(2.29) 
0.0011** 
(2.00) 
 
Chair’s years at current university 
  0.0103 
(1.19) 
0.0096 
(1.40) 
Number of institutions where 
Chair has worked 
  0.1160* 
(1.70) 
0.1134** 
(2.17 
Share of world publications to non- 
US Economics departments 
   -0.169*** 
(-2.87) 
Institution’s share of publications to 
business and policy schools 
   0.0397* 
(1.93) 
Total economics PhDs granted at the 
Chair’s university 
   0.0008 
(1.60) 
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University revenueª 
   0.0064** 
(2.01) 
 
University’s share of federal grants 
   -0.0555 
(-1.39) 
 
Department productivity trend 
   2.6217*** 
(4.34) 
 
FIELD DUMMIES    YES   YES     YES     YES 
YEAR DUMMIES    YES   YES     YES     YES 
R² 0.102 0.106 0.160 0.330 
Citations number at which the Chair 
quadratic reaches its maximum 
 
14,806 
 
15,081 
 
15,399 
 
18,067 
 
 
n=825; *** - significant at 0.01 level; ** - significant at 0.05 level; * - significant at 0.10 level; 
Clustered t-statistics in parentheses. 
Research output of a department is measured by a 3-yr moving average of quality-weighted publications 
Field dummies are dummy variables for the Chair’s sub-specialty. 
The university revenue variable includes revenues from tuition and fees, government appropriations (federal, state 
and local), private gifts, grants and contracts, endowment income, sales and services of educational activities, 
"auxiliary enterprises", hospitals, "other sources", and "independent operations". 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1  
  
Economics Department Rankings 
 
Economics Department Rankings based on the Mean Annual Research Output of Total Weighted 
Publications Authored by Individuals with an Affiliation in an Economics Department at a US  
University (publication counts measured over 1995-2010 in 11 select journals)1, 2 
             Annual Research Output      Aggregate Research Output 
      In All Years 1995 through 2010           Shares in the Years        
    Rank3 Mean St. d. Min  Max    1995-02    2003-10   Change  
Harvard     1  7.72 1.50 5.22 10.40      7.53            7.86   0.32 
M.I. T.       2  7.03 1.49 4.39  9.99      7.85            6.45  -1.40 
Princeton     3  5.33 2.06 2.07  8.12      5.76            4.76  -1.00 
Univ. of Calif., Berkeley   4  4.32 2.21 0.73  8.45      3.14            5.76   2.61 
Chicago     5  4.23 1.96 2.09  8.98      4.76            3.61  -1.14 
New York University    6  3.67 1.44 0.93  6.31      3.24            4.07   0.82 
Yale      7  3.44 1.44 1.50  6.60      3.22            3.63   0.40 
Stanford     8  3.38 1.56 1.26  7.58      2.60            4.39   1.78 
Northwestern     9  3.25 1.12 1.60  5.83      2.65            3.86   1.21 
Pennsylvania    10  3.16 1.27 0.97  5.33      3.08            3.02  -0.06 
Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles  11  2.91 1.09 1.14  4.13      2.33            3.66   1.32 
Columbia    12  2.67 1.56 1.02  5.49      1.99            3.64   1.64 
Michigan    13  2.17 0.86 0.76  3.85      2.41            1.82  -0.59 
Univ. of Calif., San Diego  14  2.15 1.32 0.91  6.01      2.26            1.90  -0.36 
Wisconsin    15  2.06 0.97 1.04  4.88      2.24            1.81  -0.43 
Brown     16  1.98 0.89 0.61  4.02      1.82            2.16   0.34 
Minnesota    17  1.74 1.04 0.59  5.03      1.65            1.82   0.17 
Boston University   18  1.71 0.80 0.68  3.01      2.14            1.17  -0.96 
Maryland    19  1.55 0.97 0.39  4.47      1.15            1.82   0.66 
Texas, Austin    20  1.24 0.88 0.18  3.65      1.80            0.69  -1.10 
Rochester    21  1.24 0.58 0.41  2.45      1.61            0.88  -0.73 
Cornell     22  1.17 0.50 0.15  1.89      1.24            1.04  -0.20 
Cal Tech     23  1.15 0.75 0.00  2.47      1.06            1.32   0.26 
Duke     24  1.11 0.60 0.36  2.27      0.74            1.54   0.79 
Ohio State    25  1.11 0.48 0.28  2.02      1.25            0.90  -0.34 
Dartmouth    26  0.99 0.69 0.00  2.35      0.70            1.31   0.61 
Johns Hopkins    27  0.96 0.55 0.21  2.04      1.15            0.70  -0.45 
Carnegie-Mellon   28  0.90 0.41 0.00  1.71      0.71            1.09   0.38 
Pittsburgh    29  0.90 0.68 0.09  2.23      1.10            0.61  -0.49 
Penn State    30  0.90 0.53 0.21  2.02      0.92            0.85  -0.07 
Illinois      31  0.86 0.61 0.06  2.36      0.96            0.84  -0.12 
Univ. of Calif., Davis   32  0.85 0.52 0.13  1.90      0.83            0.91   0.07 
Virginia    33  0.83 0.42 0.12  1.64      1.16            0.56  -0.59 
Boston College    34  0.78 0.41 0.25  1.66      0.72            0.87   0.15 
Georgetown     35  0.77 0.56 0.00  1.84      0.75            0.81   0.06 
USC     36  0.75 0.59 0.05  2.38      0.66            0.73   0.06  
Iowa     37  0.71 0.53 0.00  2.19      0.97            0.42  -0.54 
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Michigan State    38  0.70 0.45 0.16  1.67      0.80            0.56  -0.23 
Univ. of Calif., Santa Barbara  39  0.67 0.53 0.04  1.68      0.71            0.65  -0.06 
Arizona State University  40  0.63 0.52 0.00  1.51      0.66            0.74   0.08 
Washington, St. Louis   41  0.53 0.37 0.00  1.17      0.46            0.64   0.18 
Univ. of Calif., Santa Cruz  42  0.50 0.41 0.00  1.58      0.38            0.59   0.21 
Florida     43  0.45 0.44 0.00  1.75      0.65            0.22  -0.42 
Rutgers     44  0.43 0.39 0.00  1.43      0.69            0.24  -0.45 
Univ. of Calif., Irvine    45  0.42 0.39 0.00  1.52      0.30            0.53   0.23 
University of Arizona   46  0.41 0.22 0.00  0.90      0.44            0.39  -0.05 
North Carolina, Chapel Hill  47  0.40 0.43 0.00  1.58      0.48            0.29  -0.18 
Vanderbilt    48  0.40 0.20 0.00  0.79      0.44            0.36  -0.08 
Texas A&M    49  0.39 0.46 0.00  1.71      0.54            0.23  -0.31 
Houston    50  0.39 0.28 0.00  0.89      0.46            0.30  -0.16 
Rice     51  0.37 0.37 0.00  1.15      0.38            0.28  -0.10 
Washington    52  0.36 0.39 0.00  1.25      0.59            0.14  -0.45 
Purdue     53  0.35 0.32 0.00  1.29      0.43            0.30  -0.13 
Oregon     54  0.33 0.25 0.00  0.84      0.39            0.26  -0.12 
Iowa State    55  0.32 0.28 0.07  1.23      0.20            0.49   0.29 
Colorado    56  0.32 0.26 0.00  0.89      0.30            0.38   0.08 
Indiana     57  0.30 0.20 0.00  0.61      0.39            0.23  -0.16 
Emory      58  0.25 0.23 0.00  0.73      0.19            0.31   0.12 
SUNY, Albany     59  0.24 0.24 0.00  0.84      0.29            0.22  -0.06 
SMU     60  0.21 0.14 0.00  0.50      0.24            0.18  -0.06 
Delaware    61  0.20 0.41 0.00  1.66      0.24            0.11  -0.13 
VPI       62  0.16 0.20 0.00  0.58      0.26            0.05  -0.21 
Notre Dame    63  0.16 0.23 0.00  0.62      0.11            0.23   0.12 
George Mason    64  0.12 0.29 0.00  1.14      0.04            0.24   0.20 
 
1   Publication data is collected annually over the years 1995 through 2010 from the following 11 selected 
journals: American Economic Review, Econometrica, Economic Journal, Economica, International 
Economic Review, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Monetary Economics, Journal of Political 
Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics, and the Review of 
Economic Studies.  Only data relating to full articles are collected, thus excluding comments, replies and 
other such shorter forms of communications.  
 
2   The weighted measures convert page counts to AEA-equivalent pages, use the 1/n rule for coauthored 
articles, and apply a quality indexing using the journal “Impact Factors” provided in the various annual 
editions of the Social Sciences Journal Citation Reports. 
 
3   To be included in these rankings, an institution’s Department of Economics must have had one of the 
top-60 research outputs during either the 1995-2002 period or the 2003-2010 period (or both).  
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Table A2  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variable     
Change in department’s research output:   -9.88E-6 0.629 -2.817 3.369 
     
Independent Variables     
     
(1) Chair’s research output     
Chair’s citations (to 5 most-cited articles) 3531.5 4979.0 58 31323 
Previous Chair’s citations (to 5 most-cited 
articles) 
3226.4 5113.0 56 31323 
Years since Chair’s most-cited work 12.97 4.79 2 33 
Chair’s total weighted publications 22.87 17.70 2.16 111.52 
     
(2) Chair Characteristics     
Female Chair 0.067 0.250 0 1 
Foreign born Chair 0.290 0.454 0 1 
Years as Chair 3.24 1.98 1 15 
Chair’s Experience at Appointment 21.08 6.44 9 44 
Chair’s years at university 14.55 8.61 0 42 
Number of institutions where Chair has 
worked 
2.10 1.09 1 6 
        
(3) Institution Controls     
Department’s research output at the start 
of the Chair’s term 
1.531 1.763 0.000 8.562 
Share of world publications to non-US 
Economics departments (%) 
55.08 2.63 50.93 61.19 
Institution’s share of economics 
publications to business and policy 
schools (%) 
1.73 3.08 0 14.48 
Total economics PhDs granted at Chair’s 
university 
208.5 124.4 42 555 
University revenue (100 millions) 18.311 13.654 1.002 101.599 
University’s share of federal grants (%) 1.64 1.13 0.06 5.72 
     
(4) Field Dummies      
Microeconomics 0.158 0.365 0 1 
Macroeconomics 0.108 0.310 0 1 
History/Thought 0.044 0.204 0 1 
Quantitative 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Public Finance 0.050 0.217 0 1 
Monetary 0.121 0.327 0 1 
International 0.093 0.291 0 1 
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Agriculture/Environment 0.040 0.196 0 1 
Industrial Organization 0.080 0.271 0 1 
Labor 0.168 0.375 0 1 
Other 0.036 0.187 0 1 
(5) Time Dummies     
1996 0.019 0.138 0 1 
1997 0.035 0.184 0 1 
1998 0.052 0.222 0 1 
1999 0.063 0.243 0 1 
2000 0.068 0.252 0 1 
2001 0.078 0.270 0 1 
2002 0.081 0.272 0 1 
2003 0.082 0.275 0 1 
2004 0.079 0.270 0 1 
2005 0.075 0.264 0 1 
2006 0.084 0.277 0 1 
2007 0.088 0.284 0 1 
2008 0.076 0.266 0 1 
2009 0.067 0.250 0 1 
2010 0.051 0.220 0 1 
     
 
 
